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We investigate how bank migration across state lines over the last quarter century has 
affected the size and covariance of business fluctuations across states.  Starting with a 
two-state version of the unit banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we 
conclude that the theoretical effect of integration on business fluctuations is ambiguous 
because integration dampens the impact of bank capital shocks but amplifies the impact 
of firm collateral shocks.  The net effect empirically seems stabilizing, however, as we 
find fluctuations in employment growth within states falls as integration rises, especially 
when we instrument for the level of integration and control for employment composition 
within states.  Integration also weakens the link between bank capital growth within 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The United States once had 50 little banking systems, one per state, because all 
the states effectively blocked entry by out-of-state banks.  Under that segregated system, 
the fate of each state and its banks were closely tied; as went the states, so went the 
banks.  Farm price deflation in the early 1980s bankrupted many farmers and many farm 
banks, just as falling oil prices in the late 80s wiped out a lot of Texans and Texas banks.  
Now that states have mostly opened their borders to out-of-state banks, the banking 
industry is converging toward a single system dominated by the very large holding 
companies with banks operating in many states (Map).  
Whether this integration of our banking system has any real, macro consequences 
depends on whether these intermediaries provide any unique services to the economy.  If 
not, if banks are just another thread in a financial veil, then their integration is largely 
irrelevant; we might expect second- or third-order benefits at most in the form of paper 
work reduction and back-office consolidation. 
Integration gets a lot more interesting if banks are essential producers of 
important monitoring and risk-sharing services.  As a starting point for thinking about 
those more important effects, our paper lays out a modified version of Holmstrom and 
Tirole’s (1997) banking model.  Bankers in their model can prevent moral hazard—by 
monitoring firms—and they can commit moral hazard—by neglecting to monitor.  These 
hazards make the equilibrium rate of investment in the economy depend on the level of 
firm collateral and bank capital; these seemingly backward-looking state variables give 





parties honest.  Exogenous shocks to either variable cause equilibrium investment to fall, 
i.e., collateral damage and capital crunches are both contractionary.   
To see whether interstate banking alters those effects, we add a second (physical) 
state to the H-T model.  Both collateral and capital shocks are still contractionary, not 
surprisingly, but interstate banking changes their magnitudes: bank capital shocks in state 
A have a smaller impact with interstate banking, but the impact of collateral shocks gets 
bigger.  These derivatives are fairly complicated functions of the frictions in the model, 
but the intuition is straightforward and general: a holding company that is diversified 
across two states can import capital to state A if lending opportunities there are still good, 
but a collateral shock in state A will lead the holding company to export capital and 
lending away from that state.   
Rather than try to identify these effects separately (the econometric equivalent of 
laser surgery it seems to us), we ask the data whether the net effect of integration has 
been to make state economies more or less stable.
1  Table 1 suggests the answer.  As 
states’ banking systems integrated, the state-specific variation in employment, variation 
that can be not be attributed either to aggregate business cycles or to differences in 
average growth across states, fell.  The decline in volatility was large, dropping by more 
than one-half, from 2.4% in the late 1970s to 1.1% in the middle of the 1990s.
2   Personal 
income growth displayed a similar trend; we include these figures in Panel B to show that 
                                                 
1 Banks and firms share risk to some extent, so they end up inheriting each other’s problems.  The precise 
division of those risks (and the bad outcome) would depend in a complicate way on ex ante contracts and 
ex post bargaining power.  Nor do we consider the welfare benefits of integration, but presumably welfare 
rises as volatility falls.  
2 These figures are the root mean squared error from a regression of state employment growth on a time 
effect (to remove aggregate cycles) and a state effect (to remove state differences in mean growth).  See 





there was no trend decline toward lower state-specific volatility during the 1960s and 
1970s, prior to deregulation-induced bank integration.
3 
The empirical results presented below convince us that this correlation between 
state volatility and bank integration is no coincidence.  Using a panel of state-year data on 
employment growth over 1976-1994, we link fluctuations in employment growth around 
the state-year average to banking integration and find that it fell significantly as banks 
became increasingly integrated (via holding companies) with out-of-state banks.  The 
panel data also allow us to control for reductions in volatility across all states, and thus 
demonstrate that state-specific increases in banking integration were followed by state-
specific decreases in business cycle fluctuations.  Various “endogenous integration” 
possibilities are also considered, but rejected, because we find even stronger results when 
we use instruments for integration.  Controlling for the composition of employment in 
each state also strengthens the result.   
The net stabilizing we find suggests that the insurance or diversification against 
bank capital shocks associated with integration more than offset any amplified effect on 
collateral.  Although we avoid trying to identify those separately, we do find that the link 
between growth in capital at banks in a state and growth in that state’s employment (and 
bank lending in that state) is substantially reduced once its banks become more closely 
tied to other states’ banks.  That is certainly consistent with our conclusion that 
integration over the last quarter century has helped stabilize state economic activity by 
helping banks diversify against shocks to their own capital.  
                                                 
3 Personal income growth is a somewhat less reliable measure of economic activity that occurs within a 
state than employment growth because it attributes income generated from returns on capital earned 
anywhere to individuals living within the state.  For this reason, we will focus the remainder of our 





 Although our focus here is on volatility in state economies, integration has 
important implications for bank stability and risk as well; operating across many states 
should have obvious diversification benefits, although how that plays out in terms of 
banks’ risk taking is less obvious (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997).  Our findings here also 
bear on developments in Europe, where banks are just starting to integrate across nations 
(judging from their liability mix in Chart 1).
4  Applying our findings there would imply 
that further bank integration abroad should lead to smaller, but more correlated, national 
business cycles.  More generally, our results may inform thinking about worldwide 
financial integration, since “globalization” is just a scaled-up version of the national 
integration studied here. 
  
II. Interstate Banking   
  Capital and banking market integration have been considered in a variety of 
contexts.  The international literature on capital market integration (across nations) 
focuses mostly on the risk-sharing benefits of integration; cross-country diversification of 
asset portfolios tends to smooth aggregate consumption within nations.  We doubt that 
banking integration in the U.S. has important risk-sharing effects for savers since they 
could always diversify via the stock market.  In fact, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that U.S. 
capital markets play a more vital role in income and consumption smoothing across states 
than do credit markets.  The international literature does find, however, that increased 
capital market integration may actually amplify the own-country effect of productivity 
                                                 
4 Except, of course, for the banking centers of Switzerland and the U.K. and the three “Benelux” nations. 
Garcia Blandon (2001) finds that foreign bank entry in Europe is impeded by various non-regulatory 
barriers, such as cultural distance between consumers, while export levels and the presence of 





shocks as capital is able to flee a country afflicted with a productivity slump.  Our model 
of interstate banking has some of that flavor. 
  Williamson (1989) compares the unit banking system in the U.S. to the more 
integrated system in Canada.  Using an equilibrium costly monitoring model, he argues 
that the cross-province banking there should have stabilized the Canadian banking system 
relative to the U.S. unit banking system.  His model also implies, somewhat counter-
intuitively, that integration amplifies the impact of aggregate real shocks.  Integrated 
banking systems are less volatile, in other words, but the economy as a whole becomes 
more volatile.
5   
  Our paper, by contrast, investigates how banking integration affects state 
volatility (rather than bank or aggregate volatility).  Our model introduces a second 
physical state to the (unit) banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to illustrate 
how interstate banking can alter the impact of various shocks and thus affect the 
amplitude of the business cycle.  As it turns out, interstate banking is not necessarily 
stabilizing because some types of shocks get dampened, but other types get amplified. 
II.1 The Holmstrom and Tirole  Model  
  The HT model comprises three players: firms, financial intermediaries, and 
investors.  All are risk neutral.  Firms have access to identical project technologies, but 
they differ in their initial capital endowments:  0 A .  Financial intermediaries (“banks”) 
and investors can both lend to firms, but only the banks have monitoring know-how; the 
                                                 
5  The counterintuitive result that integration amplifies the effect of real shocks seems to stem from the 
type of shock considered (a mean preserving increase in the projected technology risk) and on a hard-to-
explain effect of bank diversification on the elasticity of credit demanded by firms. His evidence from the 





uninformed investors must rely on monitoring by the banks.  Investors have access to an 
alternative investment opportunity. 
  Technology. Firms choose between a good project and either of two bad projects.  
The “good” project succeeds with probability  H p ;  both “bad” projects succeed with 
probability  L p .  A key parameter in the model is the good and bad projects’ relative 
likelihood of success:  0 > - = D L H p p p .  All of the projects return  R per-unit 
invested if they are successful and 0 if not.  R is public. The two bad projects also 
produce differing amounts of private benefits (to the firm):  type b bad projects produce a 
small private benefit (b);  type B bad projects produce a larger private benefit (B >b).   
  Moral Hazard and Monitoring.  Moral hazard arises because of the private 
benefits from bad investments; firms may choose bad projects over good projects (with 
higher expected returns) because the former produce private (i.e., unshared) benefits. 
Monitoring by a bank can prevent type B investment, but not type b investment.   The 
idea here is that monitoring is an effective deterrent against obvious fraud and abuse 
(e.g., simply absconding with the borrowed funds), but smaller abuses, (shirking, etc.) 
must be remedied through incentive schemes.   Monitoring costs are proportional to the 
amount invested; if investment is I, monitoring costs = cI.  Monitoring is itself a private 
activity, in that savers cannot determine if bankers have actually monitored a given firm.  
Private monitoring creates a second moral hazard; unless it is worthwhile, bankers will 
only pretend to monitor.  Banks must invest enough of their own capital in the project to 
ensure that they will monitor adequately.
6   
                                                 
6 Project risk is not completely diversifiable so banks need a stake in the project (or else they would shirk 





  Contracts. Firms will always choose a mix of liabilities, borrowing from both the 
bank and investors.  If the project succeeds, the firm, bank monitor, and uninformed 
investors receive  Rf, Rm and Ru.  These shares are determined endogenously, of course, 
by the opportunity costs of the three parties.  We prefer the intermediation interpretation 
of financing structure offered by HT: investors deposit their money with the bank, and 
banks fund the firms they monitor with those deposits and the bank’s own capital.  The 
bank’s ability to attract deposits depends on its own capital (which is needed to assure 
uninformed investors that it will monitor firms adequately).
7 
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics.   Given the rates of return required by investors 
(g ) and banks ( b ), a firm with initial assets  0 A  chooses investment (I), its own capital 
contribution (A), and its mix of liabilities to maximize its expected profits: 
  ) ( ) ( max 0 0 A A Ru p Rm p RI p A U H H H - + - - = g   subject to: 
  RI ‡ Rf + Rm + Ru    (1) 
p bI Rf D ‡ /      (2) 
  p cI Rm D ‡ /      (3) 
  The main budget constraint (1) limits the sum of returns to the three parties to the 
total return on the investment.
8  Eq. (2) is an incentive constraint on the firm; the gain in 
expected payments to the firm from choosing the good project cannot be less than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Under the certification interpretation, uninformed investors invest directly in the firm, but only after the 
monitor has taken a large enough financial interest in the firm that the investor can be assured that the firm 
will behave diligently.  
 





private benefit from choosing the first bad project.  Eq. (3) is an incentive constraint on 
the intermediary; the expected gain in return to the bank from forcing the firm to choose 
the good project must exceed the cost of monitoring, else the bank will not monitor.  
Together, Eq. (1)-(3) define the maximum pledgeable income  ) / ) ( ( p c b R pH D + - , i.e. 
the maximum payment per unit of investment that can be promised to uninformed 
investors without destroying incentives. At the optimum, all constraints will bind. 
  Because firms choose the same optimal policy per unit of own capital, an 
economy-wide equilibrium is easily found by aggegating across firms. Let  Kf  be the 
aggregate amount of firm capital,  Km the aggregate amount of informed capital, and  Ku 
the aggregate supply of uninformed capital. The first two are fixed, while the third is 
determined so that the demand for uninformed capital (the sum of the pledgeable 
expected returns of individual firms, discounted by g) equals the supply of uninformed 
capital.  Let  ) (Ku g  be the inverse supply function. The equilibrium in the market for 
uninformed capital obtains when 
(1a)                             ( ) Ku Ku p c b R Ku Km Kf pH ￿ = D + - + + ) ( / ) ( ) ( g .   
  The equilibrium rates of return in the two capital markets are  
(2)  ( ) Ku p c b R K p Ku H / / ) ( ) ( D + - = g  
(3) ) /( p Km K c pH D ￿ ￿ = b , 
where  Ku Km Kf K + + =  is the total amount of capital invested. 
  Holmstrom and Tirole show how shocks to each player’s capital affect the 





decrease in informed capital (a capital “crunch”) decreases g  and increases  b .  A fall in 
firms’ capital (a collateral “squeeze”) decreases g  and decreases  b .   
The model can also be used to examine how the two types of shock affect the 
availability of external finance and firms’ investment spending. First, there is a direct 
contractionary effect due to the fact that the capital crunch and the collateral squeeze lead 
to a reduction in the amount of capital that can be invested in the firm by the bank and by 
the entrepreneur, respectively. Second, there is an indirect contractionary effect due to the 
fact that the collateral squeeze and the capital crunch reduce the pledgeable income that 
can be promised to uninformed debtholders without destroying incentives. The decrease 
in the pledgeable income affects negatively firms' ability to attract uninformed capital 
(see equation 1a).  
II.2 Interstate Banking in the HT Model  
  We extend the HT model to interstate banking by simply adding another physical 
state.  The only subtlety is in the treatment of capital mobility across states under the two 
banking regimes (unit and interstate) that we want to compare.  For simplicity, we make 
the extreme assumption that informed capital is completely immobile across states under 
unit banking.  In other words, unit banking is equivalent to the single state world HT 
considered.  At the opposite extreme, we assume that informed capital is completely 
mobile across states under interstate banking.  These extreme assumptions are not 
necessary for our results below, however; we obtain qualitatively similar results so long 
as informed capital is relatively less mobile under unit banking.  Note that we also 
assume that the return on uninformed capital is exogenous and equal across states for 
both unit banking and interstate banking.  This is consistent with the fact that uninformed 





On this securities market, there is a quasi-unlimited supply of investment opportunities, 
with a rate of return independent of state-specific shocks.   
  The appendix contains details on the extended model, the equilibrium, and the 
comparative statics. In short, the own-state effect of a bank capital shock is diminished 
under interstate banking because bank capital can flow from other states that did not 
experience a shock.  The own-state impact of a firm collateral shock is amplified under 
interstate banking because banks in the affected state are free to shift their lending across 
the border to firms with better collateral.  Thus, the net effect of integration on volatility 
is ambiguous.  The following propositions compare the impact of the two shocks under 
unit banking and interstate banking.  
  Proposition 1: with interstate banking, the negative impact of a bank capital 
crunch in state 1 on the amount of uninformed and informed capital invested in that state 
is smaller than with unit banking.  The intuition for this result is that with interstate 
banking, the increase in  b  caused by the bank capital crunch will attract bank capital 
from state 2. This will mitigate the impact of the bank capital crunch on the availability 
of external finance in two ways. First, the bank capital inflow leads to a lower decrease in 
the amount lent by banks to firms in state 1. Second, because the amount lent by banks to 
firms in state 1 decreases less, we also have a smaller reduction in the pledgeable income 
that can be promised to uninformed investors by firms in state 1 without breaking 
incentives. As a result, we have a smaller reduction in the amount of uninformed capital 
that firms in state 1 can attract. With unit banking, these mitigating effects do not take 





  Proposition 2: with interstate banking, the negative impact of a collateral squeeze 
in state 1 on the amount of uninformed and informed capital invested in that state is 
larger than with unit banking. The intuition for this result is that with interstate banking, 
the decrease in  b  following the collateral squeeze will induce bank capital to move to 
state 2. Here again, two effects must be distinguished. First, the bank capital flight leads 
to a decrease in the amount lent by banks to firms in state 1. Second, because of this 
reduction of the amount lent by banks to state 1 firms, we also have a decrease in the 
pledgeable income that can be promised to uninformed investors. As a result, there is a 
reduction of the amount of uninformed capital that state 1 firms can attract. With unit 
banking, these amplifying effects do not take place, since bank capital cannot move 
across states.  
  In sum, cross-state banking amplifies the effects of local shocks to entrepreneurial 
wealth (or, equivalently, productivity shocks) because capital chases the highest return.  
Capital flows in when collateral (productivity) is high and out when it is low, making the 
highs higher and the lows lower.  Integration dampens the impact of bank capital supply.  
This source of instability becomes less important because entrepreneurs are less 
dependent on local sources of funding in an integrated market since bank capital can be 
imported from other states. 
 
III.  Empirical Strategy and Data 
Identifying the separate shocks just discussed seems like an impossible task.  
Even with the requisite data, the high correlation between bank capital and borrower 





ask a more tractable (but still useful) question:  how has banking integration across states 
affected overall volatility within states?  Do state-specific business fluctuations get bigger 
or smaller as banks in the state become increasingly integrated with banks in other states?  
We know from the model that if bank capital shocks are more a source of volatility than 
collateral shocks, the net effect of integration should be stabilizing.   Integration, in other 
words, should reduce volatility. 
Endogenous Integration? 
Reverse causality of two sorts concerns us.  First, increased cross-state banking 
may indicate merely that states’ economies are becoming more integrated; banks may 
simply follow their customers across state lines.  If so, and if “real” integration (as 
opposed to bank integration) affects business volatility, our results may confuse the 
effects of real vs. bank integration.  Reverse causality could arise also via banking 
“hangovers” (from too much farming, or too much oil), as the associated distress and 
volatility may attract bargain-hunting banks from other states.  (In fact, we find evidence 
of this idea below.)  To guard against these or other potential endogeneity problems, we 
instrument for integration using an indicator equal to one after a state entered an interstate 
banking agreement, and the number of years elapsed since the agreement. 
A Brief History of Interstate Banking 
  Restrictions on interstate banking in the U.S. date back to the infamous Douglas 
Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act.  With that amendment, 
banks or holding companies headquartered in one state were prohibited from acquiring 
banks in another state unless such acquisitions were permitted by the second state’s 





barred interstate banking.  Change began in 1978, when Maine passed a law allowing 
entry by out-of-state BHCs if, in return, banks from Maine were allowed to enter those 
states (entry meaning the ability to buy incumbent banks).  No states reciprocated, 
however, so the integration process remained effectively stalled until 1982, when Alaska, 
Massachusetts, and New York passed laws similar to Maine’s.
9  State deregulation was 
nearly complete by 1992, by which time all states but Hawaii had passed similar laws.
10  
The process was completed in 1994 with the passage of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) that mandated complete interstate banking as 
of 1997 and gave states the option to permit interstate branching.
11 
  This roughly 15-year history provides an excellent opportunity to test how the 
resulting integration has affected volatility.  Luckily for us, the states did not deregulate 
all at once, and the subsequent integration across states proceeded at different rates (Chart 
2).  The staggered deregulatory events provide us with both cross-sectional and time 
series variation with which to identify the effects of integration; also, the deregulatory 
events themselves provide a good instrument for integration.
12 
Measuring Integration and Volatility  
  Our measure of bank integration equals the share of total bank assets in a state 
that are owned by bank holding companies that also hold banking assets in other states 
                                                 
9 As part of the Garn-St Germain Act, federal legislators amended in 1982 the Bank Holding Company Act 
to allow failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by any bank holding company, regardless of state laws (see, 
e.g., Kane (1996) and Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). 
10 State-level deregulation of restrictions on branching also occurred widely during the second half of the 
1970s and during all of the 1980s. 
11 IBBEA permitted states to opt out of interstate branching, but only Texas and Montana chose to do so.  
Other states, however, protected their banks by forcing entrants to buy their way into the market. 
12 While we focus here on interstate banking, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) report that state-level growth 
accelerated following branching deregulation; Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that branching 





(or other countries).  To illustrate, if a state had one stand-alone bank and one affiliated 
bank of equal size, integration in that state would equal ½. 
  We associate volatility with the year-to-year deviations (from average) in 
measures of business activity.   Starting with the annual growth rate of series x for state i 
in year t, we first subtract off the mean growth rate in x for state i over time.  
“Demeaning” by the state average removes long-run growth differences across states.  
We then subtract off the mean growth rate of series x across states in year t.  Demeaning 
by the national average each year helps control for aggregate business fluctuations.  We 
are left with the state-specific shock to our measure of business activity.  Our volatility 
measures will be the square of the resulting deviations, the log of the squared deviations, 
or the absolute value of these deviations. 
  Our sample starts in 1976, a few years before interstate deregulation began.  We 
end the sample in 1994, the year that the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act became law.  Riegle-Neal allowed bank holding companies to acquire 
banks in any state after September 29, 1995 and permitted mergers between banks in 
different states as of June 1, 1997, which effectively allowed nationwide branch 
networks.  The law also gave states the right to adopt an earlier starting date for interstate 
bank mergers, however, and about half of the states did so (Spong, 2000).  In response, 
banks such as NationsBank consolidated operations from several other states into its 
primary North Carolina bank (NationBank NC N.A.), leading to an increase of this 
bank’s (and hence North Carolina’s) assets from $31 billion in 1994 to $79 billion in 
1995.  Because of this cross state consolidation, we lose the ability to measure bank 





  Our two measures of business activity are the annual growth rates of total state 
employment and small-firm employment, where we define a small firm as one with fewer 
than 20 employees.
13  Numbers on total employment are available from 1976-94 from the 
Census Bureau.  Small-firm employment comes from the Bureau’s County Business 
Patterns series, starting in 1977 (1978 after converting to growth rates).
14  In principle, 
the more bank-dependent firms in the latter category may be more affected by banking 
integration.  To isolate the volatility that is specific to these small firms, we remove the 
state-specific shock to employment that is common to both small and large firms before 
constructing our measure of volatility.  We do this by regressing small-firm employment 
growth on the state effect (removes the long-run state mean growth rate), the time effect 
(removes the current aggregate business cycle) and the growth rate in employment at 
large firms (those with more than 250 employees).  We use the residuals from this 
regression to construct our measures of small-firm volatility.
15 
  Table 2 reports summary statistics for the integration and volatility measures.  
The average share of integrated bank assets over the full sample of state-years was 0.34, 
rising from under 0.1 in the 1970s to about 0.6 by the mid-1990s.  Overall employment 
grew 2.3 percent per year on average over the sample of state-years.  The squared 
deviation of employment growth from its mean averaged 0.03 percent, and, perhaps more 
                                                 
13 The employment data from the County Business Patterns are stratified by establishment size rather than 
firm size.  Thus, there may be some misclassifications in cases of large firms operating many small-scale 
plants. 
14The small firm and total employment data are not directly comparable as the former excludes self-
employed individuals, employees of private households, railroad employees, agricultural production 
employees, and most government employees. We drop Delaware and South Dakota as these two states’ 
banking sectors are dominated by credit card banks due to their liberal usury laws.  See Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1999 for details. 
15 The justification for this procedure is a pragmatic one.  We are comfortable that firms with fewer than 20 





interpretable, the absolute deviation of employment growth averaged 1.3 percent.  Small-
firm employment growth was slightly more volatile than overall employment growth, 
averaging 0.04 percent for squared deviations and 1.4 percent for absolute deviations.  
We also control for the share of employment in a given state/year in each of eight broad 
industrial categories (one-digit SIC), along with the sum of squared shares in these 
groups as a measure of the diversification across industries in a given state/year.  (We call 
the diversification index the “labor share HHI”.)  The summary statistics for these 
variables are also reported in Table 2. 
 
IV.  Results 
IV.1 State Business Volatility Declines with Bank Integration 
  In view of the ambiguous theoretical relationship between integration and 
volatility, we choose to report a variety of relationships.  We have two growth measures 
(total employment and small-firm employment) and three ways to define volatility.  Also, 
for each dependent variable, we report both a fixed effects regression (OLS) and an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimate.  IV seems advisable because the pace of integration 
may itself depend on volatility as noted earlier.  We use two instruments in the first stage: 
an indicator variable equal to zero before a state entered an interstate banking agreement 
with other states and one after; and a continuous variable equal to zero before interstate 
banking, and equal to the log of the number of years that have elapsed since a state 
entered an interstate banking arrangement with other states.
16 
                                                                                                                                                 
difficult-to-categorize group of firms.  We therefore leave these firms out in trying to isolate the shock to 
employment growth at small firms. 
16 In the first stage models, both instruments have very strong explanatory power.  These regressions are 





  As noted, employment volatility will obviously depend on labor force 
composition, so we also control for the share of employment in each one-digit SIC sector 
(manufacturing, services, etc.) and employment concentration (the sum of the squared 
shares).  In all specifications we control for the year and state, so the resulting fixed effect 
estimates reveal how increased integration within a state in a given year is related to 
volatility within the same state and year.
17 
  Tables 3 and 4 report the estimated coefficients for the twelve specifications.  For 
overall employment growth, all of the estimates are negative, and five of the six are 
statistically significant at the five percent level (Table 3).  Integration has had, on net, a 
stabilizing influence on state business volatility.  In addition, the IV coefficient estimates 
are much larger than the corresponding OLS estimates in all three cases, implying that 
the stabilizing influence of integration is larger (if less precisely estimated) when we use 
deregulation variables to parcel out the endogenous variation in integration.
18  In fact, the 
portion of integration that is orthogonal to deregulation is strongly positively related to 
employment volatility (not reported), perhaps because out-of-state banking companies 
opportunistically enter new states when banks in those states are facing difficulties 
                                                 
17 But other important changes occurred during the 1980s, such as rapid adoption of sophisticated financial 
models and increased use of securitization, not just for residential mortgages but also for consumer loans, 
commercial real estate loans and even commercial and industrial loans (Mishkin and Strahan, 1999).  These 
new technologies seem to have increased the efficient scale in banking and may be responsible, in part, for 
greater integration. For an exhaustive review of the causes and consequences of financial consolidation in 
the U.S., see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
18 One might object that interstate banking deregulation itself may be determined, in part, by the volatility 
of a state’s business cycle.  For example, perhaps political pressure for opening a state’s banking system to 
out-of-state competition intensifies during economic downturns (when volatility is high).  To rule out the 
possibility that endogenous deregulation drives our IV results, we have also estimated the model after 
dropping the 3 years just prior to deregulation as well as the year of deregulation itself.  In these 
specifications, the coefficient increases in magnitude (i.e. becomes more negative), and its statistical 





associated with an economic downturn.  (Remember: banks enter new states by buying 
their way in.)
19 
  We do not find evidence in these regressions that diversification across industries, 
measured by the labor share HHI index, reduces volatility, as one might expect.  There is 
very little time-series variation in this index, however, making it difficult to measure its 
coefficient in the fixed effects models.  If we drop the state fixed effects and estimate the 
model with random effects instead, the labor share HHI does enter the regression with a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient (not reported).   
  We also find declines in employment growth volatility at small firms, where we 
expect the influence of banking, and hence banking integration, to be most important 
(Table 4).  Here, we find a statistically significant effect of banking integration on 
volatility in five of our six specifications.  Moreover, the declines in volatility are larger 
for the small firms than for overall employment in all of the IV specifications. 
  The IV estimates for both overall and small-firm employment imply a substantial 
stabilizing benefit from integrating bank assets across states.  The share of integrated 
bank assets rose from around 10 percent in 1976 to around 60 percent in 1994; the 
reduced form model (not reported) suggests that about one-half of this increase can be 
attributed to interstate deregulation, or an increase in integration of 25 percent.  Based on 
the coefficient from the IV model, this 25 percent increase in integrated bank assets 
reduced the absolute deviation of overall state employment growth by 0.9 percent (Table 
3, column 6).  This decline is very large relative to the mean (1.3 percent) and standard 
                                                 
19 We have also estimated this model with a full set of interactions between the year effects and the state-
level industry employment share variables in order to allow the impact of the aggregate shock to depend on 
a state’s industry mix.  These results give very similar results for the effect of integration on volatility (i.e. 





deviation (1.2 percent) over the whole sample.  For small-firm employment, the IV 
estimate suggests that the 25 percent increase in integrated bank assets led to a drop in 
volatility of 1 percent (Table 4, column 6). 
  Table 5 reports a slightly more complex model in which we interact the labor 
share HHI index with the banking integration variable.  We find that banking integration 
matters more when a state specializes in one or a few broad industries.  In states with a 
well-diversified economy (i.e. states with many industries), we should not expect banking 
integration to matter very much.  A well-diversified state will have well-diversified (unit) 
banks too, thus reducing the potential benefit of integration.  In contrast, in a state that 
relies heavily on one or two sectors, banks constrained to operating only there will also 
rely on those one or two sectors.  Integrating these banks ought to have greater benefits, 
and the results suggest that it has.  To understand the magnitude of this interaction, 
consider two states, one with labor share HHI one standard deviation below average, and 
the other with labor share HHI one standard deviation above average.  The poorly 
diversified state’s growth volatility (absolute value of growth deviation) would decline by 
1.2 percent following the 25 increase in integration, while the well-diversified state’s 
growth volatility would decline by just 0.6 percent (Table 5, column 6). 
IV.2 Integration Weakens the Links between Bank Capital and Business Activity 
  The model laid out in Section 2 suggests that the stabilizing effects of integration 
occur because of better diversification against bank capital shocks.  If capital falls in state 
A, affiliated banks in state B will be happy to supply more to take advantage of good 





outside the state.  Therefore, integration ought to weaken the link between bank capital 
growth within a state and growth in both lending and business activity in that state. 
  To test this idea, we estimate how local employment growth, as well as loan 
growth by local banks, correlates with local capital growth, and how this correlation has 
changed in response to banking integration.  To be precise, we regress state employment 
growth (total and small firm), aggregate growth of commercial and industrial loans, and 
aggregate growth of commercial real estate loans on: the growth in total bank capital held 
at banks in the state, our measure of banking integration, and an interaction between 
banking integration and bank capital growth.
20  If the model is right, capital growth ought 
to be highly correlated with both employment growth and loan growth prior to banking 
integration, but much less correlated after.  That is, the coefficient on the interaction term 
ought to be negative.
21  (In all of the specifications, we also include time and state fixed 
effects.) 
  The results in Table 6 suggest that as states integrate, local bank capital becomes 
much less correlated with measures of overall economic activity (employment growth) 
and with lending by banks in the state.
22  For example, prior to banking integration, a one 
standard deviation decline in bank capital growth (a decline of 8.4 percent) was 
associated with a reduction in employment growth of 1.4 percent (Panel A, column 1).  
                                                 
20 The data on commercial and industrial loans only become available after 1984, so these regressions have 
fewer observations than the others. 
21 The approach is somewhat similar to studies testing whether bank lending becomes less sensitive to their 
own capital or to the supply of local deposits if the bank is part of a multi-bank holding company.  Our test 
is essentially an aggregated version of these tests.  We ask:  does a bank system become less sensitive to its 
own financial health when it is integrated with banks outside the system?  See Houston and James (1997) 
and Jayaratne and Morgan (1999). 
22 We have also estimated these regressions using IV, where an instrument for integration is constructed 
from a indicator variable equal to one after state-level interstate banking reform and a continuous variable 
equal to the log of the number of years elapsed since reform.  These results are similar to those reported in 





With full banking integration, the model suggests that a one standard deviation decline in 
bank capital growth would be associated with a slight increase in employment growth.  
We find similar effects of banking integration on employment growth at small firms; 
bank capital matters a lot prior to integration but much less after.   
  Table 6 also shows that the link between bank capital and loan growth to 
businesses declined sharply after banking integration.  Here, the effects are even more 
striking.  Prior to integration, we estimate a coefficient on capital that is not statistically 
significantly different from one.  Capital growth and loan growth moved one-for-one; if 
capital growth fell by one percent in a year, so did loan growth.  In contrast, the 
coefficient on capital growth falls almost to zero after full integration.  A zero coefficient 
makes sense in a fully integrated banking system – a banking system in which all of the 
state’s banking assets are owned by companies operating in other states too – because 
lending will be determined by the presence or absence of good projects, not the presence 





  The U.S. used to have 50 little banking systems, one in every state. With 
deregulation over the last twenty-five years, we now have a more integrated, national 
banking system with holding companies operating banks in many different states.  As a 
theoretical matter, the impact of cross-state banking on business volatility is ambiguous 
because integration immunizes borrowers from shocks to their own banks but exposes 





before the mid-1980s was, in all likelihood, a source of state business volatility.  On net, 
integration was stabilizing; employment growth fluctuations in a state diminished as its 
banks commingled with other states’ banks.  State business cycles have become smaller, 
in other words, but more alike.  As the French say: the more things change, the more they 
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Appendix: Comparative statics  in the HT Model with unit and interstate 
banking 
Equilibrium with unit banking 
With unit banking and assuming  g  exogenous, equilibrium on the uninformed 
capital market in state 1 obtains when  
(1a)                             ( )
u u
H Ku p c b R Ku Km Kf p 1 1 1 1 / ) ( ) ( ￿ = D + - + + g .   
Solving this equation, we obtain the equilibrium quantity of uninformed capital 
attracted by firms in state 1 
(2a)                            
g ￿ D + D ￿ - +
+ D ￿ + - -
=
p p R c b p
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Equilibrium in state 2 can be defined in a similar way. 
Equilibrium with interstate banking 
Interstate banking changes the equilibrium in the following way.  Assuming 
capital can move freely across states, the shares  1 p  and (1- 1 p ) of aggregate informed 
capital Km1+Km2 invested in each state adjust endogenously to equalize the return on 
informed capital across states. When the share of informed capital invested in each state 
is endogenous, equilibrium in the uninformed capital market under interstate banking is 
defined by 
(3a)              ( )( )
i i
H Ku p c b R Ku Km Km Kf p 1 1 2 1 1 1 / ) ( ) ( ￿ = D + - + + + g p  
(4a)         ( )( )
i i
H Ku p c b R Ku Km Km Kf p 2 2 2 1 1 2 / ) ( ) )( 1 ( ￿ = D + - + + - + g p . 




(5a)             ( ) ( ) ) )( 1 ( / ) ( / 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 Km Km p K c p Km Km p K c p H H + - D ￿ ￿ = + ￿ D ￿ ￿ = p p b . 
With 
i Ku Km Km Kf K 1 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( + + + = p  and 
i Ku Km Km Kf K 2 2 1 1 2 2 ) )( 1 ( + + - + = p  
Solving the system of equations defined by (3a)-(5a), we obtain the equilibrium 
quantities attracted by firms in each state and the share of informed capital invested in 
each state: 
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Comparative statics 
To get the intuition for proposition 1 and 2, we compare the equilibrium condition for 
unit banking (1a) and for interstate banking in state 1 (3a), after substitution of  1 p by its 
reduced-form solution in (8a). The equilibrium conditions for the two regimes are plotted 
in figure 1. 
Let’s first consider the bank capital crunch. With unit banking, the reduction in the 
pledgeable income is proportional to the reduction of  1 Km . With interstate banking, by 
contrast, the reduction in the pledgeable income is less than proportional to the reduction 
of  1 Km , since  1 p is smaller than unity. Graphically, this implies a smaller reduction of 
the intercept of the curve representing the pledgeable income. Because the pledgeable 
income decreases less with interstate banking following a bank capital crunch, we also 





A similar mechanism is at work for the collateral squeeze. With unit banking, the 
reduction in pledgeable income is proportional to the reduction of  1 Kf . With interstate 
banking, by contrast, the reduction in pledgeable income is more than proportional to the 
reduction of  1 Kf , because the share of informed capital  1 p invested in state 1 – which 
depends on the amount of capital available in the two states – also decreases following a 
decrease of  1 Kf . Graphically, this implies a larger reduction of the intercept of the curve 
representing the pledgeable income. Because the pledgeable income decreases more with 
interstate banking following a collateral squeeze, we also have a larger reduction in the 
amount of uninformed capital that can be attracted by firms.  
 
Capital crunch: proof of proposition 1 
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Km  is  
Impact on the availability of uninformed capital 
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Km  is  
g ￿ D + D ￿ - +
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1 1 Km Ku
u ¶ ¶  is positive. The numerator is positive because the positiveness of the 
payment promised to uninformed investors,  0 ) / ) ( ( > D + - = p c b R K Rm , implies 
0 ) ( > D ￿ + - - p R c b pH . The denominator is also positive, because the return on 
uninformed capital g  has to be larger than the pledgeable expected income 
) / ) ( ( p c b R pH D + -  to have an interior solution for  1 Ku  (see HT, p. 682). For the 
interstate banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Km  is 
( ) g ￿ D + D ￿ - +
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1 1 Km Ku
u ¶ ¶ is twice as large as  1 1 Km Ku
i ¶ ¶ .¦  
Impact on the availability of informed capital 
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Km  with respect to itself is equal to unity. 
For the interstate banking case, the quantity of informed capital attracted by firms in state 
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under the above mentioned symmetry conditions.  
1 2 1 1 / ) ( Km Km Km ¶ + ¶p  is smaller than unity. ¦  
 
Collateral squeeze: proof of proposition 2 
Impact on the availability of uninformed capital 
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Kf  is  
g ￿ D + D ￿ - +
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1  . 
1 1 Kf Ku
u ¶ ¶  is positive. 
For the interstate banking case, the derivative of  1 Ku  with respect to  1 Kf  is equal to 
( ) g ￿ D + D ￿ - +




p p R c b p Kf















under the symmetry conditions  2 1 Kf Kf =  and  2 1 Km Km =  at initial values.  1 1 Kf Ku
i ¶ ¶  
is positive. 
The difference between the two derivatives is 
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1 2 1 2 Kf Ku Kf Ku
u i ¶ ¶ - ¶ ¶ is positive. ¦  
Impact on the availability of uninformed capital 
For the unit banking case, the derivative of  1 Km  with respect to  1 Kf is equal to zero, 
since  1 Km  is independent of  1 Kf . 
For the interstate banking case, the quantity of informed capital attracted by firms in state 
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under the above mentioned symmetry conditions.  





State-Specific Business Cycle Shocks have Fallen as Integration Has Risen 
 
We decompose employment growth and personal income growth, for which we have a longer time series, 
in state j in year t as follows: 
 
    Yj,t=aj+bt+ej,t 
 
Where aj is the state-specific average growth rate over the period; bt is the aggregate shock to growth at 
time t; ej,t is the time t shock to growth that is specific to circumstances in state j.  We estimate these 
regressions separately over 5 non-overlapping periods (i.e. the state fixed effect is allowed to be different 
over each of the 5 periods).  
 















1977-1981  Pre-Interstate Banking  2.4%  14% 
1982-1985  Transition  2.2%  26% 
1986-1989  Transition  1.9%  46% 
1990-1993  Transition  1.6%  53% 
1994-1997  Post-Interstate Banking  1.1%  59% 
 
 





Root MSE Of 
State-Specific 








1962-1966  Pre-Interstate Banking  3.5%  Low
* 
1967-1971  Pre-Interstate Banking  2.0%  Low 
1972-1976  Pre-Interstate Banking  3.9%  Low 
1977-1981  Pre-Interstate Banking  3.0%  14% 
1982-1985  Transition  2.0%  26% 
1986-1989  Transition  1.9%  46% 
1990-1993  Transition  1.3%  53% 
1994-1997  Post-Interstate Banking  1.5%  59% 
1998-2000  Post-Interstate Banking  1.0%  High
* 
*Integration equals the share of banking assets in a state owned by a multi-state bank holding company.  
We do not have the data to construct this integration measure before 1976 or after 1994.  (The figure for the 
1994-1997 period is the average for 1994.)  Note that interstate integration continued after 1994 due to 
cross-state consolidation such as the merger of Bank of America (a west coast bank holding company) and 
NationsBank (an southeast bank holding company) in 1998.  We cannot construct our measure of 
integration after 1994 because bank holding companies began to consolidate their holding of bank assets 
across state lines in 1995.  We believe that the integration figure would be higher than 59% during the last  




Table 2  
Bank Integration, Business Volatility and State Labor Share 
Summary Statistics 
 
Statistics calculated using state-year observations.  Integration is the share of bank assets in each state held 
by banks with offices out of the state.  Growth is the annual growth in employment or small firm 
employment, where a firm is defined as small if it has fewer than 20 employees.  Volatility is based on the 
deviation in the annual growth of total employment or small firm employment (firms with fewer than 20 
employees) from state and national means.  To construct this deviation for small firms, we also control for 
employment growth at large firms (firms with more than 250 employees). 
             






A.  Integration  931  0.34  0.28 
 
B. Employment 
   
Employment Growth  931  0.023  0.023 
Squared Deviation from Expected Growth  931  0.0003  0.0007 
Log of Squared Deviation from Expected Growth  931  -9.66  2.40 
Absolute Value of Deviation from Expected Growth  931  0.013  0.012 
 
C.  Small-Firm Employment (< 20 Employees) 
   
Employment Growth  823  0.023  0.026 
Squared Deviation from Expected Growth  823  0.0004  0.0008 
Log of Squared Deviation from Expected Growth  823  -9.58  2.46 
Absolute Value of Deviation from Expected Growth  823  0.014  0.013 
       
D.  Labor Shares       
Mining  870  0.013  0.018 
Construction  870  0.048  0.014 
Manufacturing  870  0.194  0.112 
Transportation  870  0.055  0.012 
Trade  870  0.229  0.038 
Finance  870  0.054  0.013 
Services  870  0.221  0.060 
Government  870  0.188  0.048 
Labor Share HHI (Sum of Squared Shares)  870  0.203  0.058 





Employment Growth Volatility Falls with Banking Integration 
 
Regressions are based on a panel of state-year observations.  Integration is the share of bank assets in each 
state held by banks with offices out of the state.  Growth is the annual growth in employment.  Volatility is 
based on the deviation in the annual growth of total employment from state and national means.  
Coefficients estimated with state-year observations over 1976-94 (standard errors in parenthesis).  All 
models include state and year fixed effects.  
 
 





























































           



































































































N  870  870  870  870  870  870 
R
2  0.1093  0.0874  0.1339  0.1179  0.0831  0.1328 





Employment Growth Volatility in Small Firms Falls with Banking Integration 
 
Regressions are based on a panel of state-year observations.  Integration is the share of bank assets in each 
state held by banks with offices out of the state.  Growth is the annual growth in employment at small 
establishments, defined as establishments with fewer than 20 employees.  Volatility is based on the 
deviation in the annual growth of total employment from state and national means; in addition, we control 
for growth at large establishments (defined as those with more than 250 employees).  Coefficients 
estimated with state-year observations over 1976-94 (standard errors in parenthesis).  All models include 
state and year fixed effects.  
 
 





























































           



































































































N  778  778  778  778  778  778 
R
2    0.1765  0.1012  0.1731  0.1903  0.1008  0.1802 





Employment Growth Volatility Falls with Banking Integration, 
Particularly in States with Highly Concentrated Economies 
 
Regressions are based on a panel of state-year observations.  Integration is the share of bank assets in each 
state held by banks with offices out of the state.  Growth is the annual growth in employment.  Volatility is 
based on the deviation in the annual growth of total employment from state and national means.  
Coefficients estimated with state-year observations over 1976-94 (standard errors in parenthesis).  All 
models include state and year fixed effects.  
 
 












































































           



































































































N  870  870  870  870  870  870 
R
2  0.1231  0.0891  0.1448  0.1263  0.0862  0.1424 





Integration Lowers the Correlation between Employment, Loan Growth and Bank Capital  
 
Reported are fixed effects regression coefficients and standards errors (in parenthesis) estimated for panel 
of 48 states and D.C.  The dependent variable and associated estimation periods are indicated at the top of 
each column.  Bank capital growth is the annual growth rate of total capital held by all banks headquartered 
in each state.  Integration is the share of bank assets in each state held by banks with offices out of the state.  
All regressions include state and year fixed effects (not reported).  
 
Panel A: Employment Growth 
 
Dependent variables:   Employment growth 
(1976-94) 
Small-firm employment growth  
(1978-94) 
   

















2  0.542  0.604 
N  882  823 
F-test that Bank Capital + 







Panel B: Loan Growth 
 
Dependent variables:   
C&I loan growth 
(1978-1994) 
Commercial real estate loan 
growth 
(1985-1994) 
   

















2  0.444  0.426 
N  490  882 
F-test that Bank Capital + 
















           Chart2: Cross-State Banking Waves






















Interstate banking agreements occurred in waves between 1982 and 1993.  States were grouped by the
year that they entered into an agreement.  Plotted for each wave is the median share of out-of-state
banking assets for states in each wave.
o:  1982-1984 wave
D:  1985-1987 wave
:  : 1988-1990 wave
  :  1991-1993 waveChart 1: Cross-Nation Bank Liabilities in Europe (1988 and 1997)
































Source: Bank of International Settlements